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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee,
v.
:

Case No. 970128-CA

:

Priority No. 2 (incarcerated)

WILLIAM MICHAEL EDWARDS,
Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(e) provides this Court's
jurisdiction over this appeal from a criminal case involving a
conviction less than a first degree felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE
Did the trial court abuse his discretion in denying Mr.
Edwards' motion to withdraw his guilty pleas?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review applicable to denials of motions to
withdraw guilty pleas is set forth in State v. Holland, 921 P.2d
430 (Utah 1996), as follows:
[The Court reviews] a trial court's denial of a motion
to withdraw a guilty plea under an "abuse of
discretion" standard, incorporating the "clearly
erroneous" standard for the trial court's findings of
fact made in conjunction with that decision. However,
the ultimate question of whether the trial court
strictly complied with constitutional and procedural
requirements for entry of a guilty plea is a
constitutional and procedural requirements for entry of
a guilty plea is a question of law that is reviewed
for correctness.
Id. at 433 (citations omitted).

PRESERVATION OF ISSUE
Mr. Edwards preserved the issue in the district court, when
he moved to withdraw his guilty pleas and filed a memorandum in
support of his motion (R. 15-20).

He filed a supplemental

memorandum in support of his motion to withdraw (R. 2 9-3 6) # and a
reply memorandum to the State's memorandum opposing withdrawal of
the pleas (R. 45-52).

After a full evidentiary hearing (R. 191-

232), the trial court denied the motion to withdraw the pleas (R.
59-61, 80-82).

Mr. Edwards filed a petition for interlocutory

review, and this Court denied the petition (R. 87). Mr. Edwards
also briefed the issue in his motion for a certificate of
probable cause filed in the trial court (R. 92-99).

He also

briefed the issue in moving for a certificate of probable cause
before this Court, which denied the motion over the dissent of
Judge Orme (R'. Ill) .
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES
The following statutory and constitutional provisions and
rules pertain to this appeal, and are reproduced in full in the
addendum:
Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, section 1
Utah Code Ann. section 41-6-44 (1996)
Utah Code Ann. section 53-3-220 (1994)
Utah Code Ann. section 58-3 7-8
Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203
Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-204
Utah Code Ann. section 77-13-6
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. DISPOSITION
The State of Utah charged Mr. Edwards with one count of
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. section 58-37-8, and with one count
of driving under the influence, a class B misdemeanor violation
of Utah Code Ann. section 41-6-44, for events which allegedly
occurred on May 26, 1996 (R. 4-5). At the first appearance on
June 10, 1996, before Judge Dever, Mr. Edwards informed the court
that J. Franklin Allred would represent him; however, Mr. Allred
informed the court on June 25, 1996, that Allred had not been
retained (R. 85). The preliminary hearing was originally set for
July 10, 1996 (R. 83), but was continued for ten days by Justice
of the Peace William E. Pitt, in order for Mr. Edwards to find an
attorney (R. 85). On July 17, 1996, the preliminary hearing was
set for August 7, 1996 (R. 38, 85) .
On August 7, 1996, Mr. Edwards appeared without counsel and
pled guilty as charged before Judge Rokich (R. 6 through 14).
A copy of his plea affidavit and the transcript of the plea
colloquy are in the addendum to this brief.1
On September 3, 1996, after Mr. Edwards retained J. Franklin
Allred to represent him, Mr. Edwards moved to withdraw his guilty
pleas (R. 15-20), and later supplemented the original memorandum

1

The transcript of the plea colloquy is mislabeled
"preliminary hearing," and erroneously indicates that the hearing
took place before Judge Pitt.

3

in support of the motion to withdraw the pleas (R. 2 9-36).

The

State opposed the motion to withdraw the pleas (R. 3 9-44), and
Mr. Edwards filed a reply memorandum in support of withdrawal of
the pleas (R. 45-52) .
Counsel for Mr. Edwards moved to recuse Judge Rokich, and
Judge Dever took over the case (R. 84).
Following an evidentiary hearing before Judge Dever, the
trial court denied the motion to withdraw the pleas (R. 191-233,
59-61) .
The trial court granted Mr. Edwards7 motion for a stay
pending the outcome of Mr. Edwards' petition for interlocutory
appeal to this Court, which petition this Court denied in case
number 970028-CA (R. 68-69, 87).
Prior to sentencing, Mr. Edwards filed a motion for a
certificate of probable cause, to stay any sentence to be imposed
pending Mr. Edwards' direct appeal (R. 91-99) .
On February 24, 1997, Judge Dever imposed and suspended a
prison sentence of zero to five years for the possession
conviction, and imposed and suspended a concurrent sentence of
six months in jail for the DUI conviction, placing Mr. Edwards on
probation (R. 106-107).

As conditions of probation, Judge Dever

ordered Mr. Edwards to serve 12 0 days in jail with work release,
and fined Mr. Edwards $1,500 (R. 105). Judge Dever denied the
motion for a certificate of probable cause (R. 102-103).
Mr. Edwards filed a timely notice of appeal on March 4, 1997
(R. 100-101).
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This Court denied Mr. Edwards' motion for a certificate of
probable cause, over the dissent of Judge Orme (R. Ill). This
Court also denied Mr. Edwards7 motion for summary reversal of the
trial court.
RELEVANT FACTS
Before Judge Rokich, Mr. Edwards pled guilty as charged to
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, and
to driving under the influence, without having or waiving the
assistance of counsel (R. 7-14, 121-127).
The errors which occurred during and following the entry of
the plea are numerous and substantial, and are detailed with
proper citations to the record in the argument portion of this
brief.
During the proceedings on Mr. Edwards' motion to withdraw
the guilty pleas before Judge Dever, the prosecution never
articulated any prejudice it would suffer if the pleas were
withdrawn.
Judge Dever summarily denied the motion to withdraw the
pleas in an order indicating that the pleas were knowingly and
voluntarily entered (R. 81).
A copy of the order is in the addendum to this brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court abused his discretion in denying Mr.
Edwards' motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.

Numerous errors

during and following the entry of the pleas render the pleas
involuntary and require their withdrawal upon Mr. Edwards'
5

motion.
The factors requiring withdrawal of the pleas, and discussed
fully in the argument section of the brief include the illusory
nature of the prosecutor's promise which induced Mr. Edwards to
enter the pleas, the prosecutor's breach of the plea bargain, the
absence of Mr. Edwards' waiver of his right to counsel prior to
entering the plea without counsel, the absence of a factual basis
for the pleas, the failure of the trial court to correctly
identify the potential punishment for the DUI charge and
consequences of both convictions, and the failure of the trial
court to comply with Rule 11 in the entry of the pleas.
The entry of the plea on the basis of the illusory plea
bargain, the entry of the plea in violation of rule 11, and the
breach of the plea agreement all violated Mr. Edwards'
fundamental constitutional rights, including his rights to due
process of law.

See e.g. State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 670-

771 (Utah App. 1993); Constitution of Utah, Article I section 7;
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, section 1.
Particularly because the State never articulated any
prejudice that would have occurred in the event of a withdrawal
of the guilty pleas, the trial court's denial of Mr. Edwards'
motion to withdraw constitutes an abuse of discretion.
ARGUMENT
• The general law governing the presentence withdrawal of
guilty pleas is stated in State v. Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040 (Utah
1987), as follows:

6

The entry of a guilty plea involves the waiver of
several important constitutional rights, including the
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the
right to trial by jury, and the right to confront
witnesses. Because the entry of such a plea
constitutes such a waiver, and because the prosecution
will generally be unable to show that it will suffer
any significant prejudice if the plea is withdrawn, a
presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea should in
general, be liberally granted.
Id. at 1041-42.
In the instant matter, the State never articulated any
prejudice, undue or otherwise, that would be caused by granting
Mr. Edwards' presentence motion to withdraw his guilty pleas.
Under Gallegos, withdrawal would have been appropriate.
Utah Code Ann. section 77-13-6 is the statute governing
withdrawal of pleas.

It states in full,

(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any
time prior to conviction.
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be
withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with leave of
the court.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of
guilty or no contest is made by motion and
shall be made within 3 0 days after the entry
of the plea.
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of
an imprisoned person under Rule 65B, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Given that Mr. Edwards' motion to withdraw his guilty pleas
was made on September 3, 1996, after the pleas were entered on
August 7, 1996, the motion was timely filed.

Id.

As the

following discussion demonstrates, the motion for withdrawal of
the pleas was supported by good cause, and should have been
granted.
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I.
MR. EDWARDS7 FAILURES TO UNDERSTAND
THE NATURE OF AND OBTAIN
THE BENEFIT OF THE PLEA BARGAIN
RENDER THE PLEAS INVOLUNTARY
AND SUBJECT TO WITHDRAWAL.
A. MR. EDWARDS' FAILURE TO UNDERSTAND THE ILLUSORY PLEA BARGAIN
ENTITLES HIM TO WITHDRAW THE PLEAS.
Mr. Edwards agreed to plead guilty as charged in exchange
for the prosecutor's promise to abstain from filing a charge of
driving on revocation, as set forth in the plea agreement as
follows:
14. My pleas of guilty are the result of a plea
bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney.
The promises, duties and provisions of this plea
bargain, if any, are full [sic] set forth as follows:
Upon my plea of guilty to Count 1 & 2 the state will
not charge me with driving on Revocation, will
recommend probation and not oppose a motion to reduce
Count 1 to a class A misdemeanor upon completion of
probation.
(R. 10)(emphasis in original).
At the time of his arrest in this matter, Mr. Edwards was
not driving on a revoked license, and thus, the prosecutor had no
basis for charging Mr. Edwards with driving on revocation (R.
208) .
The record establishes that the prosecutor misunderstanding
of the value of the plea bargain.

In his cross-examination of

Mr. Edwards, the prosecutor implied that at the time of the entry
of the plea bargain, the prosecutor believed that Mr. Edwards'
license was revoked because the police officer who arrested Mr.
Edwards had noted on the DUI citation that the citation would not
serve as a temporary license due to Mr. Edwards' prior DUI (R.
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215-216).

In arguing against withdrawal of the pleas, the

prosecutor argued that the prosecutor believed that Mr. Edwards'
license was revoked when they entered into the plea agreement,
and that he offered to abstain from filing the driving on
revocation charge as an "incentive" for Mr. Edwards to plead
guilty as charged (R. 229).
Mr. Edwards did not understand the nature of the
prosecutor's incentive for pleading guilty as charged --to
abstain from charging Edwards with driving on revocation when the
prosecutor had no basis for such a charge -- for Edwards would
not have pled guilty as charged without expecting to receive
something in exchange (R. 211).2
Despite the trial court's admonition to the contrary,3 Mr.

2

Cf. State v. West, 765 P.2d 891, 896 (Utah 1988) ("To
deny defendant relief on the merits, we would have to assume that
he willingly bargained to plead guilty, expecting and receiving
nothing in return. This assumption is highly speculative and
implausible where a plea bargain is involved. The nature of plea
bargains requires the exchange of consideration, allowing the
parties involved to reach a mutually desirable agreement. A plea
bargain is a contractual relationship in which consideration is
passed. In fact, the remedy for a defendant where the State
fails to fulfill its side of the bargain is frequently specific
performance. A plea bargain does not involve a situation where a
defendant willingly pleads guilty to a crime, neither asking nor
expecting anything in return.") .
3

During the plea colloquy, the following discussion

occurred,
[THE COURT]: Now your plea must be unconditional.
The fact that the State may make a recommendation
doesn't necessarily mean that the Judge who imposes the
sentence will follow those recommendations. It's got
to be an unconditional plea. Do you understand that?
Any question about it?
[MR. EDWARDS]: No.
[THE COURT]: IF YOU'RE NOT PLACED ON PROBATION

9

Edwards had the mistaken belief that by pleading guilty under the
terms of the plea agreement, he would avoid the risks of being
incarcerated and losing his license (R. 205).
Mr. Edwards' belief that pleading guilty under the terms of
the plea agreement would avert the possibilities of his
incarceration and loss of his license was also a misunderstanding
of the plea agreement, for regardless of the terms of plea
agreement, by pleading guilty, Mr. Edwards risked being
incarcerated for up to five years on the possession charge, and
for up to six months on the DUI charge.

See e.g. Utah Code Ann.

sections 76-3-203 (stating potential incarceration terms for
felonies) and 76-3-204 (stating potential incarceration terms for
misdemeanors).

Loss of his license was an administrative

consequence of either conviction 'under Utah Code Ann. section 416-44(11) (1996) and Utah Code Ann. section 53-3-220(1)(c)(i)(A)
(1994) .
Utah law is well established on this point: when one enters
a guilty plea on the basis of an illusory or misunderstood
promise by the prosecutor, the plea is not knowing and voluntary,
and is subject to withdrawal.
For instance, in State v. West, 765 P.2d 891 (Utah 1988),
the court stated,

YOU'RE NOT GOING TO COME BACK IN AND SAY, "WELL, THEY
PROMISED ME I'D GET PROBATION?"
[MR. EDWARDS]: (INAUDIBLE).
[THE COURT]: SO AS LONG AS WE'VE GOT THAT CLEAR. ...
(R. 122-123).
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"[I]n order to plead voluntarily, a defendant must know
the direct consequences of his plea, including the
actual value of any commitments made to him. Where, as
here, counsel's alleged advice, corroborated by the
information supplied by the court, grossly exaggerated
the benefit to be derived from the pleas of guilty, it
would follow that the pleas were not voluntary."
Id. at 896 (quoting United States v. Hammond. 528 F.2d 15, 19
(4th Cir. 1975) . Accord, State v. Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266, 12741275 (Utah 1988). 4
Because Mr. Edwards misunderstood the value of the
prosecutor's inducement to enter the pleas, the pleas were
involuntary and should have been withdrawn on Edwards' motion.
Id.
B. THE BREACHED PLEA AGREEMENT ENTITLES MR. EDWARDS TO WITHDRAW
THE PLEAS.
It was Mr. Edwards' understanding, expressed prior to
sentencing and never contradicted by the prosecutor, that the
prosecutor would recommend and secure from the sentencing court
probation rather than incarceration (R. 205, 220). At the time
of sentencing, the prosecutor did not recommend probation, as
agreed,5 but argued to the court that Mr. Edwards was a danger to

Mr. Edwards informed Judge Dever, who denied the motion
to withdraw the guilty pleas, of the law pertaining to illusory
plea agreements and prosecutorial duties to comply with plea
agreements (e.g. R. 94-95, 31) .
5

The plea affidavit states, in relevant part,
14. My pleas of guilty are the result of a plea
bargain between myself and the prosecuting attorney.
The promises, duties and provisions of this plea
bargain, if any, are full [sic] set forth as follows:
Upon my plea of guilty to Count 1 & 2 the state will
not charge me with driving on Revocation, will
recommend probation and not oppose a motion to reduce

11

society, and then acquiesced in the recommendation of the
presentence report, which he characterized as "very lenient."
His argument was as follows:
Thank you, Your Honor. I don't understand the
argument as to the defendant needs to go to work et
cetera, when the recommendation is that he be granted
work release. Whether he has a rotating schedule or
not, all he needs to do to comply would be to submit a
letter from his employer with his schedule and the jail
will accommodate him and he'll be able to go to work
and support the family as he requires.
This is the defendant's seventh DUI conviction
and, as the report indicates, it should have been
charged as a class A misdemeanor. He pled guilty to a
class B misdemeanor. He has his eighth DUI pending in
Grantsville which should be a felony and apparently is
charged as a class B misdemeanor. The defendant
obviously is a danger to the community.
We believe that the recommendation is very
lenient, that it out to be adhered to. In spite of the
defendant's obtaining treatment, he has again been
arrested for DUI and obviously cannot control his
drinking. We believe that the recommendation of 12 0
days in jail plus the other standard provisions for an
alcohol offense is reasonable.
(R. 134) .
Utah law is quite clear in indicating that prosecutors must
fulfill the terms of their plea agreements.

" [W]here a defendant

reasonably relies on a governmental promise to his or her
detriment, that promise must be fulfilled."

State v. Troyer. 910

P. 2d 1182, 1193 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted) .

When a prosecutor

fails to perform the agreed conditions of the plea agreement, the
plea is rendered involuntary and the defendant is entitled to
withdraw his plea.

State v. Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266, 1275-76

Count 1 to a class A misdemeanor upon completion of
probatiorl.
(R. 10)(emphasis in original).
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(Utah 1988).

See also State v. Nine Thousand One Hundred Ninety-

Nine Dollars, 791 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah App. 1990) ("Plea agreements
must be entered into knowingly and voluntarily and if 'induced by
promises, the essence of those promises must in some way be made
known.' '[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a
promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to
be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be
fulfilled.'") (citation omitted) .6
Assuming arguendo

that the prosecutor's agreement to

recommend probation also encompassed the possibility that he
would recommend some incarceration, this demonstrates a failure
of Mr. Edwards to understand the plea bargain, which would
entitle him to withdrawal under cases such as Copeland and West,
supra.
Assuming arguendo

that the prosecutor's recommendation that

Mr. Edwards serve one hundred and twenty days in jail constitutes
a recommendation for probation, the prosecutor's nominal
acquiescence to the recommendation of the presentence report was
sharply undercut by his argument that Mr. Edwards is a danger to
society, quoted above.
Several courts have recognized that in such situations, when
a prosecutor effectively argues against his nominal
recommendation, this constitutes a breach of the plea agreement

Mr. Edwards informed Judge Dever of the law pertaining
to illusory plea agreements and prosecutorial duties to comply
with plea agreements (e.g. R. 94-95, 31).
13

to make the recommendation.

See e.g. United States v.

Grandinetti, 564 F.2d 723 (5th Cir. 1977)(prosecution breached
plea agreement to recommend a particular sentence when prosecutor
acknowledged the obligation to recommend the sentence agreed
upon, but in effect argued against the recommendation); United
States v. Brown, 500 F.2d 375 (4th Cir. 1974) ("prosecution
breached plea agreement to recommend a particular sentence when
prosecutor's argument "effectively undercut" the recommendation).
Because the prosecutor failed to abide by the terms and
conditions of the plea agreement, Mr. Edwards is entitled to
withdraw his pleas.

E.g. Copeland,

supra.

II.
THE TRIAL COURT'S FAILURE TO
FOLLOW RULE 11 IN THE ENTRY
OF THE PLEAS ENTITLES MR. EDWARDS TO
WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLEAS.
At the time that Mr. Edwards entered his guilty pleas in
this case, the trial court was required to strictly comply with
the terms of Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 in accepting the
guilty pleas.

E.g. State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987). 7

Rule 11 is designed to protect the defendant's right to due
process of law, and the constitutional rights that are implicated
in the entry of the guilty plea.
666

f

See State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d

670-771 (Utah App. 1993).
Under Gibbons, a trial court accepting a guilty plea has the

Mr. Edwards informed Judge Dever of the need for strict
compliance with Rule 11 in the entry of guilty pleas (e.g. R. 19,
31-35, 94).
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obligation to
"personally establish that the defendant's guilty plea
is truly knowing and voluntary and establish on the
record that the defendant knowingly waived his or her
constitutional rights and understood the elements of
the crime." Finally, in addition to confirming that
the defendant understands the elements of the crime,
the trial court must determine that the defendant
"'possesses an understanding of the law in relation to
the facts'" for the defendant's plea to be "'truly
voluntary.'"
State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 372-373 (Utah 1996)(emphasis in
original, citations omitted).
On August 7, 1996, when Mr. Edwards pled guilty, Utah Rule
of Criminal Procedure 11 provided, in relevant part,
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a
defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the
defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant
shall not be required to plead until the defendant has
had a reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may
not accept the plea until the court has found:
(1) if the defendant is not represented
by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived
the right to counsel and does not desire
counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to
the presumption of innocence, the right
against compulsory self-incrimination, the
right to a speedy public trial before an
impartial jury, the right to confront and
cross-examine in open court the prosecution
witnesses, the right to compel the attendance
of defense witnesses, and that by entering
the plea, these rights are waived;
(4) the defendant understands the nature
and elements of the offense to which the plea
is entered, that upon trial the prosecution
would have the burden of proving each of
those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that the plea is an admission of all those
elements;

15

(5) the defendant knows the minimum and
maximum sentence, and if applicable, the
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum
sentence, that may be imposed for each
offense to which a plea is entered, including
the possibility of the imposition of
consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of
a prior plea discussion and plea agreement,
and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of
the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that
the right of appeal is limited.
(g)(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed
by the court, the court shall advise the defendant
personally that any recommendation as to sentence is
not binding on the court.
In assessing compliance with rule 11 and the constitutional
requirements, this Court may consider the plea colloquy, the plea
affidavit, and other documents in the record.

Thurman, 911 P.2d

371 at 374.
At the outset of the hearing on the motion to withdraw the
pleas, counsel for Mr. Edwards informed the trial court that Mr.
Edwards was not advised of his rights, and that the pleas were
involuntarily entered (R. 191).
A review of the plea colloquy, affidavit and full record
confirms numerous errors in the entry of Mr. Edwards' pleas, to
be addressed in the order in which they arise in Rule 11.
A. THERE WAS NO WAIVER OF COUNSEL.
As noted above, under subsection (a) of rule 11, Mr. Edwards
should not have been permitted to represent himself in this case
until the court established a waiver of counsel on the record.
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See also e.g. State v. Frampton. 737 P.2d 183 (Utah
1987)(discussing record of waiver that trial court should
establish in allowing defendant to represent himself).
Prior to the entry of the guilty plea by one representing
himself, under subsection (e)(1) of rule 11, the district court
accepting the plea must establish both a knowing waiver of
counsel, and that the defendant does not desire counsel.
The record contains no waiver of counsel.8
During the plea colloquy, the trial court mentioned that Mr.
Edwards was representing himself (R. 122), but never discussed
Mr. Edwards' right to counsel on the record, or established that
Mr. Edwards waived his right to counsel prior to accepting
Edwards' guilty pleas (R. 122-127).
The plea affidavit does not indicate that Mr. Edwards waived
his right to counsel, but states in paragraph 2, "I have not
waived my right to counsel.

My attorney is None, and I have had

an opportunity to discuss this statement, my rights and the
consequences of my pleas with my attorneys.

I am satisfied with

his/her advice." (R. 12) . The affidavit is replete with
references to "my attorney" and indicates that Edwards is

8

At the hearing on the motion to withdraw the pleas, the
prosecutor argued that the plea affidavit indicated that Mr.
Edwards made a knowing waiver of counsel (R. 228). At the
hearing on the motion for a certificate of probable cause, the
prosecutor argued, "The defendant knowingly and intelligently
waived his right to counsel at the time the plea was entered.
The Court carefully questioned him about that." (R. 148).
The plea affidavit and transcript of the plea colloquy do
not bear these assertions out.
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satisfied with the advice and assistance of his attorneys (R. 9).
At the hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas,
Mr. Edwards testified that he could not afford to hire counsel
within the time frame established by Judge Pitt, who was
initially presiding over the case, but that Judge Pitt refused to
appoint counsel to represent him, ruling that he was not indigent
(R. 197-203).9

Mr. Edwards testified that he would have accepted

appointed counsel had counsel been offered by the court (R. 2 04).
Mr. Edwards testified that on the date that he pled guilty, he
came and talked with the prosecutor and explained that he could
not afford counsel and thought he would just have to plead guilty
(R. 2 04).

In contrast, the prosecutor indicated that Judge Pitt

had offered to provide appointed counsel (R. 2 03).
Regardless of Mr. Edwards' personal state of mind or
entitlement to appointed counsel, Judge Rokich's failure to
strictly comply with rule 11 by obtaining a waiver of counsel
prior to the entry of the pleas justified withdrawal of the
guilty pleas.

E.g. Gibbons.

supra.

B. THERE WAS NO FINDING THAT THE DUI PLEA WAS VOLUNTARY.
While the trial court made the finding that the possession
plea was voluntarily entered with the defendant's understanding
of the elements of the crime, the court made no such finding on
the plea to DUI (R. 124, 126).

Mr. Edwards grossed approximately $2,000 a month,
netted approximately $370 every two weeks and paid approximately
$420 every two weeks in child support (R. 198-200). He owned no
real estate or cars (R. 201) .
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As is discussed herein, the record as a whole demonstrates
that neither plea entered by Mr. Edwards was voluntary, and that
withdrawal was appropriate.
C. MR. EDWARDS WAS NOT FULLY INFORMED OF THE TRIAL RIGHTS HE
WAIVED BY ENTERING THE PLEAS.
Under subsection (e)(3) of rule 11, the trial court is
required to inform a defendant entering guilty pleas that by
entering the pleas, he is waiving numerous fundamental trial
rights.

That subsection requires trial courts to ascertain that

the defendant knows of the right to the
presumption of innocence, the right against compulsory
self-incrimination, the right to a speedy public trial
before an impartial jury, the right to confront and
cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses,
the right to compel the attendance of defense
witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights
are waived[.]
The plea affidavit signed by Mr. Edwards makes no mention of
the presumption of innocence, of the right to a speedy public
trial, of the right to an impartial jury (R. 9-14).10

The plea affidavit provides, in relevant part,
I am entering these pleas of guilty voluntarily
and with knowledge and understanding of the following
facts:
1. I know that I have the right to be represented
by an attorney and that if I cannot afford one, an
attorney will be appointed for me by the Court at no
cost to myself.
2. I have not waived my right to counsel. My
attorney is None, and I have had an opportunity to
discuss this statement, my rights and the consequences
of my pleas with my attorneys. I am satisfied with
his/her advice.
3. I have read this statement and understand the
nature and elements of the charges, my rights in this
and other proceedings, and the consequences of my
guilty pleas.
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In the plea colloquy, the court did not inform Mr. Edwards
of the presumption of innocence, his rights to a public trial
before an impartial jury, or of the right to compel the
attendance of defense witnesses.11

4. I know that I have a right to a trial by jury.
5. I know that if I wish to have a trial, I have
the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses
against me or to have them cross-examined by my
attorney. I also know that I have the right to have my
witnesses subpoenaed by the State at no expense to
myself unless convicted, and to have them testify in my
behalf.
6. I know that I have the right to testify in my
own behalf, but if I choose not to do so, I cannot be
compelled to testify or give evidence against myself
and no adverse inferences will be drawn against me if I
do not testify.
7. I know that if I wish to contest the charges
against me, I need only plead "not guilty" or maintain
my previously entered no guilty pleas, and the matters
will be set for trial, at which time the State of Utah
will have the burden of proving each element of the
charges beyond a reasonable doubt. If the trial is
before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous.
12. I know and understand that by pleading guilty
I am waiving my statutory and constitutional rights set
forth in the preceding paragraphs. I know that by
entering such pleas I am admitting and do here so admit
that I have committed the conduct alleged and giving
rise to the crimes of which I am pleading guilty.
(R. 11-13) .
n

- This portion of the plea colloquy includes the full
advisement given concerning trial rights waived by the entry of
the pleas:
You understand by entering a plea of guilty you're
going to be giving up certain constitutional rights,
such as the right to a speedy trial, a right to be
tried by a jury. You have a right to remain silent
during the proceedings and it will not be held against
you. You have a right to call witnesses in your own
behalf. You have a right to confront and cross examine
witnesses in your own behalf. You have a right to
confront and cross examine witnesses called by the
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Review of the record demonstrates that neither the trial
court nor the plea affidavit informed Mr. Edwards that in
pleading guilty, he was waiving his fundamental rights to the
presumption of innocence and to an impartial jury.
The trial court's failure to comply with rule 11 in the
entry of the pleas justifies their withdrawal.

E.g. Gibbons.

D. THE WAS NO ESTABLISHMENT OF A FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE PLEAS.
Under subsection (e)(4) of rule 11, the trial court must
establish that
the defendant understands the nature and elements
of the offense to which the plea is entered, that upon
trial the prosecution would have the burden of proving
each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that the plea is an admission of all those elements[.]
Under this subsection, the trial court has the obligation to find
that the defendant understands "the elements of the crimes
charged and the relationship of the law to the facts."

State v.

Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987).
The common law also requires that the trial court establish
a factual basis for any guilty plea prior to its entry.

See e.g.

State v. Stilling, 856 P.2d 666, 671-672 (Utah App. 1993).

This

means that the record must demonstrate facts which would support
a conviction for the offense to which the defendant pleads

State. The fact that you remain silent during the
proceedings will not be held against you.
The State must prove each and every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt. If the State fails to
do so, the case will be dismissed against you.
However, if you're convicted you have the right to
appeal.
(R. 123) .
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guilty.

See State v. Thurman, 911 P.2d 371, 375 (Utah 1996).

The factual basis requirement is tied directly to the
voluntariness of the plea; if the defendant does not understand
and admit to being guilty of the offense to which he pleads
guilty, the plea is not constitutionally voluntary.

See e.g.

State v. Copeland. 765 P.2d 1266, 1273 (Utah 1988).
The plea affidavit provides the following discussion of the
elements of the offenses to which Mr. Edwards pled guilty:
The elements of the crimes to which I am pleading
guilty are as follows:
1) knowingly and intentionally exercised control
over a controlled substance on May 26, 1996 in Tooele
County, Utah
2) I drove a motor vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol to a degree I could not drive
safely on May 25, 1996 in Tooele County, UT
(R. 13) .
The portion of the plea affidavit discussing the conduct
constituting the offenses to which Mr. Edwards pled guilty
provides,
My conduct and the conduct of other persons for
which I am criminally liable, that constitutes the
elements of the crimes to which I am pleading guilty
are as follows:
I was driving and saw a policeman following me so
I stopped and he made a U turn and came back to my
location, had me do field sobriety tests and arrested
me for DUI. He found methamphetamine in the car.
(R. 13) .
This discussion of conduct fails to provide a factual basis
for the possession charge, because the officer's having found
drugs in the car does not in itself establish possession within
the meaning of section 58-37-8.

See e.g. State v. Hansen, 732
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P. 2d 127, 131-32 (Utah 1987) ("The mere occupancy of a portion of
the premises where the drug is found cannot, without more,
support a finding of its knowing and intentional possession by
the accused.") .
The discussion likewise fails to provide a factual basis for
the DUI plea, for it does nothing to establish that Mr. Edwards
was driving while under the influence to a degree that he could
not do so safely or with the requisite blood or breath alcohol
level.

See Utah Code Ann. section 41-6-44 (defining offense of

driving under the influence).
The trial court's colloquy with Mr. Edwards on the nature
and elements of the offense was as follows:
[THE COURT]: The elements of the crime are found
in Title 58, Chapter 37, Section 8.2.a.i. Utah Code
Annotated that, "The defendant intentionally and
knowingly possessed a controlled substance of
methamphetamine." Are those the elements of the crime?
[THE PROSECUTOR]: They are, Your Honor.
[THE COURT]: And the facts are, Mr. Edwards, that
on or about May 26, 1996, in Tooele County, State of
Utah, you did have in your possession, and
intentionally and knowingly had in your possession
methamphetamine. Are those the facts?
[MR. EDWARDS]: Yes, sir.
[THE COURT]: Are you entering a plea of guilty
because you are, in fact, guilty of the crime as
charged in Count I?
[MR. EDWARDS]: Yes.
[THE COURT]: What is your plea then to possession
of a controlled substance, a third degree felony?
Guilty or not guilty?
[MR. EDWARDS]: Guilty.
[THE COURT] Will you sign the statement there that
is before you? The Court will find that the defendant
fully understands the elements of the crime and
knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea of guilty.
[THE COURT]: Mr. Edwards --- first of all, the
Court has foudn that he knowingly and voluntarily
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entered his plea of guilty to Count I. On Count II I
can go through the whole routine again, but will you
accept what I've asked you about
on Count II the
elements are found in Title 41, Chapter 6, Section 44,
that you were "Driving or in actual, physical control
of a vehicle of having blood or breath alcohol
concentration of .08 grams or greater or were under the
influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined
influence of alcohol and any drug to the degree which
rendered defendant incapable of driving said vehicle.
Are those the elements? Are those the elements?
[THE PROSECUTOR]: Yes, incapable of safely
driving.
[THE COURT]: And the facts are that on May 26,
1996, in Tooele County, State of Utah, you were driving
a vehicle under the influence. Are those the facts?
[MR. EDWARDS]: Yes, sir.
[THE COURT]: What is your plea then to driving or
in actual physical control of a vehicle while having a
blood or breath alcohol content of .08 grams or greater
or while under the influence of alcohol? What is your
plea? Guilty or not guilty?
[MR. EDWARDS]: Guilty, Your Honor.
(R. 124-126).
The trial court's colloquy failed to establish the
possession offense, for the court merely used the term possession
without explanation, and did nothing to clarify the plea
affidavit, to determine whether there were sufficient facts to
establish the legal element of constructive possession.
The trial court's discussion failed to establish facts
sufficient to justify a DUI conviction, for the court failed to
establish that Mr. Edwards had the requisite blood or breath
alcohol level, or was under the influence to such an extent as to
render him incapable of safely driving.
The transcript of the sentencing hearing confirms that Mr.
Edwards has consistently maintained that the drugs found in the
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car were not his (R. 138-140).
The factual basis established on this record falls short of
establishing either offense.

£f. e.g. State v. Breckenridge, 688

P.2d 440 (Utah 1983)(defendant admitted to having committed each
element of offense during plea colloquy, but because his factual
account was inconsistent with his having committed the offense,
the court found that he did not understand the nature and
elements of offense).

See also State v. Gibbons,

740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987)(discussing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S.
238 (1969), and the importance of establishing record of facts to
support pleas).
E. MR. EDWARDS WAS NOT INFORMED ACCURATELY OF THE POTENTIAL
SENTENCES.
Under subsection (e)(3) of rule 11, a trial court accepting
a guilty plea must first establish that
the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence,
and if applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the
minimum sentence, that may be imposed for each offense
to which a plea is entered, including the possibility
of the imposition of consecutive sentences[.]
Accord Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P.2d 1148, 1149 (Utah 1989).
While the plea affidavit accurately sets forth potential
sentences for a third degree felony and a class B misdemeanor,
and properly categorizes the offenses to which Mr. Edwards pled
as a third degree felony and a class B misdemeanor (R. 13-14),
when Judge Rokich took the pleas, he erroneously informed Mr.
Edwards that in pleading guilty to the DUI charge, he was
pleading to a class A misdemeanor, punishable by one year in jail
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and a $2,500 fine (R. 125).
Judge Rokich's explanation of concurrent and consecutive
sentences was also erroneous.

He stated,

[THE COURT]: . . . Since there's two counts, the
Court can sentence you consecutively or concurrently.
Now if you're sentenced concurrently you would spend 05 years in the Utah State Prison and fined $5,000.
Upon the conclusion of that sentence then you could
spend a year in the Tooele County Jail and pay a fine
of $2,500.
If they run concurrently, if they sentence you to
prison for a third degree then you're going to serve
the one time, and the sentencing would merge with
whatever the Judge sentenced you. Do you understand?
[MR. EDWARDS]: Yes.
(R. 125-126).
Neither the plea affidavit nor the trial court informed Mr.
Edwards that an administrative consequence of both convictions
was the loss of his license, under Utah Code Ann. section 41-644(11)(1996), and under Utah Code Ann. section 53-3-220
(1) (c) (i) (A) (1994) .
The trial court's failure to clearly inform Mr. Edwards of
the potential sentences and consequences of the convictions is an
adequate basis for withdrawal of the pleas.

See e.g. State in re

Hill, 621 P.2d 705 (Utah 1980)(conviction could not stand, where
juvenile and his father were not informed of the potential
consequences of his guilty plea); State v. Valencia, 776 P.2d
1332, 1335 (Utah 1989) (per

curiam)

(conviction reversed in part

for trial court's failure to advise defendant of the consequences
of his plea).
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F. MR. EDWARDS WAS NOT PROPERLY INFORMED THAT HIS RIGHT OF APPEAL
WAS LIMITED BY THE ENTRY OF HIS PLEA.
Subsection (e)(8) of rule 11 requires that the defendant be
informed that the right of appeal is limited by the entry of the
plea.
The plea affidavit informs Mr. Edwards that if he went to
trial, he would have the right to appeal (R. 11-12), but then
erroneously indicates in a general paragraph that all of the
preceding rights are waived by the entry of the guilty pleas (R.
11) .
Judge Rokich informed Mr. Edwards that he would have a right
to appeal from a conviction (R. 123), but did not inform him that
his right to appeal would be limited by the entry of the pleas.
This failure to follow rule 11 in the entry of the pleas
justifies their withdrawal.

E.g. Gibbons,

supra.

III.
ALL ERRORS DURING AND FOLLOWING THE ENTRY OF THE PLEAS
SHOULD BE ADDRESSED ON THE MERITS.
As previously noted, counsel for Mr. Edwards filed a motion
to withdraw the guilty pleas with supporting memoranda, and
conducted an evidentiary hearing in support of the motion (R. 1520, 29-36, 45-52, 191-232, 92-99).

During the course of these

matters, counsel informed Judge Dever that Mr. Edwards had not
been advised of his rights (R. 191), that the pleas were
involuntarily entered (R. 191), of the law requiring strict
compliance with rule 11 in the entry of guilty pleas (R. 19, 3135, 94), and of the law governing illusory or breached promises
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in plea bargaining (R. 31, 94-95) .
Judge Dever had the plea affidavit in the file, and was
given a copy of the transcript of the plea colloquy (R. 7-14,
52).

In denying the motion to withdraw the pleas from the bench,

Judge Dever stated,
I think the critical thing to look at here is the
plea affidavit that the defendant entered into. That
outlines what the elements of the crime are and what
rights he will be giving up by entering this plea. I
have also reviewed the transcript of the actual plea
itself and it appears from reading through this that
Mr. Edwards['] plea was voluntarily and knowing the
full understanding of his rights and I do not believe
that there are sufficient ground to allow him to
withdraw his guilty plea, therefore, I will deny your
motion.
(R. 230).
From this record, this Court may fairly conclude that the
matters raised herein were brought to the attention of the trial
court and ruled upon.12
To the extent that defense counsel omitted raising a
specific objection in the trial court to any of the errors
discussed above, this Court should nonetheless address the merits
of each error under the plain error or ineffective assistance of
counsel doctrines.
Under the plain error doctrine, appellate courts should
address those errors that are both plain and prejudicial, and may

At the time of Judge Dever's denial of the motion to
withdraw the pleas, the prosecutor had not breached the plea
agreement to recommend probation at sentencing. However, the
breach was raised at the hearing on the motion for a certificate
of probable cause, and Judge Dever denied that motion (R. 151,
102-103).
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address heavily prejudicial errors that may not have been plain
to the trial court.

E.g. State v. Eldredae, 773 P.2d 29, 35 and

n.8 (Utah), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989).
The errors involved in the instant matter should have been
plain to Judge Dever.

The law forbidding illusory or broken

promises by prosecutors in the plea bargaining process, discussed
above in Point I of this brief, is well established and clearcut.

Similarly, the law requiring strict compliance with rule

11, discussed above in Point II of this brief is very well
established and bright lined.
Given the availability of governing law and the trial
court's review of the plea affidavit and the transcript of the
plea colloquy, and presence at sentencing, the errors discussed
in Points I and II of this brief are readily apparent and plain.
See State v. Breckenridge, 688 P0.2d 440 (Utah 1983)(court
permitted claim to be raised for the first time on appeal that
defendant's right to due process of law was substantially
effected by his entry of a plea in the absence of his
understanding of the nature and elements of the crime, and in the
absence of a factual basis for the plea); State v. Brown, 853
P.2d 851, 853-54 (Utah 1992)(characterizing Breckenridge as "a
case of plain error in which the Eldredae standard was clearly
met.") .

See also e.g.

State v. Pharris, 798 P.2d 772, 774 (Utah

App.)(Court may consider failure to comply with rule 11 and
Gibbons for first time on appeal under the manifest or plain
error doctrine), cert, denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990); State
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v. Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, (Utah App. 1989) {per curiam) (same) .
Assuming arguendo

that the errors were not plain, given

their highly prejudicial nature, this Court should correct them.
Mr. Edwards has suffered and will continue to suffer the
consequences of a felony and a misdemeanor conviction because he
pled guilty as charged without counsel and without understanding
the ramifications and consequences of his pleas.

Particularly

where the prosecutor's illusory promise and breached promise
rendered the pleas involuntary, and where the record fails to
establish a factual basis for the pleas, resort to the plain
error doctrine is appropriate.

See e.g. Breckenridge and Brown,

supra.
Alternatively, this Court should reach the merits of all
issues on the basis of the ineffective assistance of counsel
doctrine.13

In order to establish ineffective assistance of

It should be noted that trial counsel for Mr. Edwards
continues to represent him on appeal.
In State v. Labrum, 881 P.2d 900 (Utah App.), vacated on
other grounds, 925 P.2d 937 (Utah 1996), this Court indicated
that claims of plain error should normally be accompanied by
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel because the errors
should have been plain to trial counsel if the errors should have
been plain to the trial court. Id. at 906. The Court further
indicated that "[W]hen trial counsel represents defendant on
appeal an ineffective assistance claim cannot be raised because
it is "'unreasonable to expect [trial counsel] to raise the issue
of his own ineffectiveness at trial no direct appeal.'" Id. at
907 (citations omitted).
While the Court may not reasonably expect counsel to allege
his own ineffectiveness, it is ethical for counsel to do so.
Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211, 221 (Utah) ("First, our experience
has been that counsel in this state have complied with their
ethical obligations and argued their own ineffectiveness on
appeal."), cert, denied, 114 S.Ct. 706 (1994).
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counsel, a party must establish that counsel's performance was
objectively deficient and that there is a reasonable probability
of a different outcome in the absence of this performance.

E.g.

State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 118 (Utah 1989).
Just as the errors discussed above should have been plain to
the trial court, the errors should have been plain to defense
counsel, who had the obligation to see to it that Mr. Edwards'
rights were protected and that he received the benefits of his
plea bargain.

S£e e.g. ABA Standards for Criminal Justice. "The

Defense Function," Standard 4-3 (requiring defense counsel to
take all appropriate actions to protect the rights of the
client).

There can be no tactical reason to abstain from raising

any of the errors discussed above.
In the absence of trial counsel's failure to raise the
issues, there is a reasonable probability of a different result,
given that Mr. Edwards' convictions should not have entered at
all, as a result of the involuntary nature of the guilty pleas.
See Verde.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse Mr. Edwards' convictions and the
trial court's order denying Mr. Edwards' motion to withdraw the
guilty pleas.
Dated this

^ ^ / '
{^ ^

day of August, 1997.

J ./Franklin Allred
Counsel for Mr. Edwards
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I, J. Franklin Allred, hereby certify that I have caused to
be mailed, first-class postage pre-paid two copies of the
foregoing to Jan Graham, 23 6 Stata Capitol Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84114, this / X / ^ * day of August, 1997.

'j. /ranklin Allred
Counsel forJMr. Edwards
^/MAILED this

day of August, 1997.
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COMES N O W . S ^ H H H M H t the defendant in this case and hereby acknowledges
and certifies the following:
I have entered a plea of guilty to thefollowingcrjnm
Name of Crime

Catagory of Offense

thkNL

S_

-Ricw

B ff\^cfcmgangr

A second degree felony carries a maximum penalty of one to fifteen years imprisonment in
the Utah State Prison, afineof up to $10.000 and a surcharge of 85% of the amount of the fine
imposed./ A third degree felony carries a maximum penalty of up tofiveyears imprisonment in the
Utah State Prison, afineof up to $5,000 and a surcharge of 85% of the amount of the fine
imposed/ A class A misdemeanor carries a maximum penalty of up to one year incarceration in
the Tooele County Detention Center, afineof up to $2,500.00 and a surcharge of 85% of the
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Defendant's Statement
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li

amount of the fine imposed. / A class B misdemeanor carries a maximum penalty of up to six
/

months incarceration in the Tooele County Detention Center, afineof up to $1,000.00 and a
surcharge of 85% of the amount of the fine imposed./ A class C misdemeanor carries a maximum

t

"penalty of up ToWdays incarceration in the Tooele County Detention Center, a fine of up to
$750.00 and a surcharge of 85% of the amount of thefineimposed.
I have received a copy of the Information against me, I have read it, and I understand the
nature and elements of the offenses for which I am pleading guilty.
The dements of the crimes to which I am pleading guilty are as follows:

Q(\ fYWj**(M<° infftQ^U
2\ 1 drfruaL a, rnoforvehicle

Gifrfy.f/kh

IAIKIW

cWncffiviLrnllluincfl. ci aicoho/ h a

My conduct and the conduct of other persons for which I am criminally liable, that
constitutes the elements of the crimes to which I am pleading guilty are as follows:

J

l^a^ cWn^Q ck(\d A i ^ a |)fl(ir£ rv\^r\ pffowmQf^

a n d (^HfYXoudos, CL U -fr/<v\ancH carwo, b«cLfe AW ftQram\xK\s hid n\c <fo i^fcl

^o\) mki ^ s ar\d aM*xk<± /wa f>c h i / (> /-fe ffwA /v^f^<tA^/anru^j^

I am entering these pleas of guilty voluntarily and with knowledge and understanding of
the following facts:
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Defendant's Statement
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1.

I know that I have the right to be represented by an attorney and that if I cannot

afford one, an attorney will be appointed for me by the Court at no cost to myself.
2.

I have not waived my right to counsel. My attorney is

,

AIOKJL

and I have had an opportunity to discuss this statement, my rights and the consequences of my
pleas with my attorneys. I am satisfied with his/her advice.
3.

I have read this statement and understand the nature and elements of the charges,

my rights in this and other proceedings, and the consequences of my guilty pleas.
4.

I know that I have arightto a trial by jury.

5.

I know that if I wish to have a trial, I have therightto confront and cross examine

witnesses against me or to have them cross-examined by my attorney. I also know that I have the
right to have my witnesses subpoenaed by the State at no expense to myself unless convicted, and
to have them testify in my behalf.
6.

I know that I have therightto testify in my own behalf, but if I choose not to do

so, I cannot be compelled to testify or give evidence against myself and no adverse inferences will
be drawn against me if I do not testify.
7.

I know that if I wish to contest the charges against me, I need only plead "not

guilty" or maintain my previously entered not guilty pleas, and these matters will be set for trial, at
which time the State of Utah will have the burden of proving each element of the charges beyond
a reasonable doubt. If the trial is before a jury, the verdict must be unanimous.
8.

I know that under the Constitution of Utah, if I were tried and convicted by a

00 01^

Defendant's Statement
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judge or jury, I would have the right to appeal my conviction and sentence to the Utah Court of
Appeals, or, where allowed, to the Utah Supreme Court and that if I could not afford to pay the
costs and attorneys fees for such appeal, those expenses for myfirstappeal would be paid by the
State of Utah.
9.

I know that the above set forth maximum possible sentences may be imposed upon

my pleas of guilty and that the sentence may be for a prison term, afineor both. I know that in
addition to the fine, an 85% surcharge, required by Utah Code Annotated § 63-63a-l will be
imposed on all fine amounts. I also know that I may be ordered by the court to make restitution
to any victim or victims of my offenses.
10.

I know that imprisonment may be for consecutive periods, or the fine for

additional amounts if my pleas of guilty are for more than one charge. I also know that if I am
incarcerated, on probation, or awaiting sentencing on any other offenses of which I have been
convicted or to which I have pleaded guilty, my pleas in the present actions may result in
consecutive sentences being imposed upon me.
11.

I know that if I am presently on probation or parole for other offenses of which I

was previously convicted, my pleas of guilty in this matter may result in a violation of my
probation or parole and additional punishment being imposed in the earlier case(s).
12.

I know and understand that by pleading guilty I am waiving my statutory and

constitutional rights set forth in the preceding paragraphs. I know that by entering such pleas I
am admitting and do here so admit that I have committed the conduct alleged and giving rise to
the crimes of which I am pleading guilty.

00 Oil

Defendant's Statement
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13.

I understand that any motion to withdraw my pleas of guilty must be filed with the

court within 30 days after the entry of my guilty pleas. I also understand that my pleas can not be
withdrawn automatically if the motion to do so is filed within said 30 days, but that I have the
burden of showing good cause why I should be allowed to withdraw said guilty pleas.
14.

My pleas of guilty are the result of a plea bargain between myself and the

prosecuting attorney. The promises, duties and provisions of this plea bargain, if any, are full set
forth as follows:

'* )/K\ rtW ^Ufi^cl
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There are no other promises.
15.

I know that any charge or sentencing concession or recommendation of probation

or suspended sentence, including a reduction of the charges for sentencing made or sought by
either my defense counsel or the prosecuting attorney are not binding on the judge. I also know
that any opinions they express to me as to what they believe the court may do are also not binding
on the court.
16.

No threats, coercion, or unlawful influence of any kind have been made to induce

me to plead guilty, and no promises except those contained in this agreement have been made to
me.
17.

I have read this statement or I have had it read to me by my attorney, and I
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understand its provisions. I know that I am free to change or delete anything contained in this
statement. I do not wish to make any changes because all of the statements are correct.
18.

I am satisfied with the advice and assistance of my attorneys.

19.

I am

3 5

years of age; I have attended school through the

1 "2

grade,

and I can read and understand the English language. I was not under the influence of any drugs,
medication or intoxicants which impaired my ability to intelligently and knowingly make the
decision to enter these pleas when I made said decision and I am not now under the influence of
any such drugs, medication or intoxicants.
20.

I believe, myself to be of sound and discerning mind, mentally capable of

understanding the proceedings and the consequences of my pleas and I am free of any mental
disease, defect or impairment that would prevent mefromknowingly, intelligently and voluntarily
entering my pleas.
DATED this 7

day of«4«», 1996.

Defendant

•L,

00 OUt)
C\<*\

Defendant's Statement
Page 7

CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT
I certify that I am the attorney for

, the

defendant above, and that I know he/she has read the statement or that I have read it to him/her
and I have discussed it with him/her and believe that he/she fully understands the meaning of its
contents and is mentally and physically competent. To the best of my knowledge and belief, after
an appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime(s) and the factual synopsis of the
defendant's criminal conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other representations
and declarations made by the defendant in the foregoing statement, are accurate and true.

Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the cases against
_ , set forth above. I have reviewed this
statement of the defendant and find that the declarations, including the elements of the offenses of
the charges and the factual synopsis of the defendant's criminal conduct which constitutes the
offenses are true and correct. No improper inducements, threats or coercion to encourage a plea
have been offered defendant. The plea negotiations are fully contained in the statement or as
supplemented on the record before the court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the
evidence would support the conviction of defendant for the offense(s) for which the plea(s) is/are
entered and acceptance of the plea(s) would serve the public interest.

7Uan K/Jeppesffli W
Deputy County Attorney
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ORDER
Based upon the facts set forth in the foregoing statement and certification, the court finds
the defendant's pleas of guilty are freely and voluntarily made and it is
ORDERED that the defendant's pleas of guilty to the charges set forth in the statement be
accepted and entered in the record in these proceedings, and that the defendant stand convicted
thereof
DONE IN OPEN COURT this

n

Ail/

7

day of&w, 1996.

BY THE COURT:

f/T^—
/ /
District Court Judge

00 00u
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STATE OF UTAH, TOOELE COU$$$EP 30 PH 3: Ql
-0O0STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff
Case No. 961000214
vs .
PRELIMINARY HEARING
WILLIAM MICHAEL EDWARDS
Defendant
-oOoBE IT REMEMBERED that on the 11th day of September,
1996, the above-entitled matter came on for hearing before
the Honorable William E. Pitt, sitting as Judge in the abovenamed Court for the purpose of this cause, and that the
following proceedings were had.
-oOoA P P E A R A N C E S
For t h e

ALAN K. JEPPESEN
Deputy County Attorney
47 So. Main Street
Tooele, Utah 84074

State

For William M. Edwards:

Self Representation

FILED
Utah Conrt of Aoneals

FILED

Marilyn i*. uanch
Clerk of the Court
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P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

State of Utah versus William Michael

3

Edwards, case number 961000214.

4

defense is present.

Are you representing yourself, sir?

5

MR. EDWARDS:

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. EDWARDS:

8

THE COURT:

9
10
11

Jeppesen.

May the record indicate the

What's that?

Are you representing yourself?
Yes, I am.

And the State's represented by Mr.

This is the time set for the Preliminary Hearing.

Mr. Jeppesen, you may call you first witness then.
MR. JEPPESEN:

Your Honor, we have come to an

12

agreement in this matter.

13

prepared to waive the Preliminary Hearing and plead guilty to

14

Count I and Count II.

15

successful completion of probation that we would now pose a

16

motion to reduce Count I to a Class A misdemeanor.

17

will recommend probation in this part of the sentence.

18
19

The defendant, we understand, is

The State has agreed that upon

We also

There has been a statement prepared.
THE COURT:

You want to stand Mr. Edwards?

Stand

2 0 J and be sworn.
21

WILLIAM MICHAEL EDWARDS,

22

having first been duly and legally sworn, was

23

examined and testified on his oath as follows:

24

THE COURT:

25

Okay, we'll proceed then.

QQ

j[ ^ ^

Mr. Edwards, do you read, write and understand tta<£
Associated Professional Reporters - (801) 322-3441
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3
1

Englis h language?

2

MR. EDWARDS :

3

THE COURT:

4

drugs or alcohol at this time?

Yes, I do.

Are you under the influence of any

5

MR. EDWARDS :

6

THE COURT:

No, I'm not.

Do you have any mental probl.ems that

7

impair your judgment :In deciding whether to plead gui lty or

8

not guilty?

9

MR. EDWARDS:
THE COURT:

10

No, I don't.

You don't have an attorney, so

11

therefore I'll have to rely upon your statements.

You don't

12

have to enter a plea of guilty, we'll go to trial if you want

13

to go to trial.

You don't want to go to trial?

14

MR. EDWARDS:

15

THE COURT:

No, I don't.

Now your plea must be unconditional.

16

The fact that the State may make a recommendation doesn't

17

necessarily mean that the Judge who imposes the sentence will

18

follow those recommendations.

19

unconditional plea.

20

about it?

It's got to be an

Do you understand that?

21

MR. EDWARDS: No.

22

THE COURT:

Any question

If you're not placed on probation

23

you're not going to come back in and say, "Well, they

24

promised me I'd get probation?"

25

MR. EDWARDS:

AA

1 4-: ^

(Inaudible).
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(

4
THE COURT:

1
2

Now, you've had an opportunity to go over that statement?
MR. EDWARDS:

3

THE COURT:
5

So as long as we've got that clear.

Do you have any questions about that

statement?

6

MR. EDWARDS:

7

THE COURT:

8

Yes, I have.

No, I don't.

Are the answers given in that statement

truthful and correct?

9

MR. EDWARDS:

10

THE COURT:

Yes, they are.

You understand by entering a plea of

11

guilty you're going to be giving up certain constitutional

12

rights, such as the right to a speedy trial, a right to be

13

tried by a jury.

14

the proceedings and it will not be held against you.

15

have a right to call witnesses in your own behalf. You have a

16

right to confront and cross examine witnesses called by the

17

State.

18

proceedings will not be held against you.

19

You have a right to remain silent during

The fact that you remain silent during the

The State must prove each and every element of the crime

20

beyond a reasonable doubt.

21

case will be dismissed against you.

22

convicted you have the right to appeal.

23

You

If the State fails to do so, the
However, if you're

Now, the penalty for a third degree felony is 0-5 years

24

in the Utah State Prison and a $5,000 fine.

The elements of

25

the crime are found in Title 58, Chapter 37, Secti^iQ 8 .j^a^i.
A^o^n at-,*H Professional Reoorters - (801) 322-3 4*1

1

Utah Code Annotated that, "The defendant intentionally and

2

knowingly possessed a controlled substance of

3

methamphetamine."

Are those the elements of the crime?

4

MR. JEPPESEN:

5

THE COURT:

They are, Your Honor.

And that facts are, Mr. Edwards, that

6

on or about May 26, 1996, in Tooele County, State of Utah,

7

you did have in your possession, and intentionally and

8

knowingly had in your possession methamphetamine.

9

the facts?

10

MR. EDWARDS:

11

THE COURT:

Are those

Yes, sir.

Are you entering a plea of guilty

12

because you are, in fact, guilty of the crime as charged in

13

Count I?

14

MR. EDWARDS:

15

THE COURT:

Yes.

What is your plea then to possession of

16

a controlled substance, a third degree felony?

17

guilty?

18

MR. EDWARDS:

19

THE COURT:

Guilty or not

Guilty.

Will you sign the statement there that

20

is before you?

21

understands the elements of the crime and knowingly and

22

voluntarily entered his plea of guilty.

23
24
25

The Court will find that the defendant fully

MR. JEPPESEN:

Your, Honor, he's also pleading to

the DUI count too, Class B misdemeanor.
THE COURT:

Let's go through that therQQ

Q0
Mf
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1

Edwards

first of all, the Court has found that he

2

knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea of guilty to Count

3

1.

4

will you accept what I've asked you about

5

elements are found in Title 41, Chapter 6, Section 44, that

6

you were "Driving or in actual, physical control of a vehicle

7

of having blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams

8

or greater or were under the influence of alcohol or any drug

9

or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to the

On Count II I can go through the whole routine again, but
on Count II the

10

degree which rendered defendant incapable of driving said

11

vehicle."

Are those the elements?

12

MR. JEPPESEN:

13

THE COURT:

Yes, incapable of safely driving.

And the facts are that on May 26, 1996,

14

in Tooele County, State of Utah, you were driving a vehicle

15

under the influence.

Are those the facts?

16

MR. EDWARDS:

17 I

THE COURT:

Yes, sir.

Now you understand the Class A

18

misdemeanor carries a penalty of one year in the Tooele

19

County Jail and $2,500 fine.

20

Court can sentence you consecutively or concurrently.

21

you're sentenced concurrently you would spend 0-5 years in

22

the Utah State Prison and fined $5,000.

23

of that sentence then you could spend a year in the Tooele

24

County Jail and pay a fine of $2,500.

25

Since there's two counts, the
Now if

Upon the conclusion

Q0

J. ;„ ij

If they run concurrently, if they sentence yxM)tQifljr^son
Associated Professional Reporters - (801) 322-3441
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1

for a third degree then you're going to serve the one time,

2

and the sentencing would merge with whatever the Judge

3 I sentenced you.

Do you understand?

MR. EDWARDS:
5 I

THE COURT:

Yes.
Are you entering a plea of guilty to

6

Count II, driving under the influence because you were, in

7

fact, driving under the influence?

You're guilty of the

8 J charge?
MR. EDWARDS:
10 I

THE COURT:

Yes.
What is your plea then to driving or in

11

actual physical control of a vehicle while having a blood or

12

breath alcohol content of .08 grams or greater or while under

13

the influence of alcohol?

14

guilty?

15

MR. EDWARDS:

16

THE COURT:

17

statement.

18

just signed; right?

What is your plea?

Guilty, Your Honor.
Okay.

MR. EDWARDS: ' Yes.

20

THE COURT:

Now the Court must sentence you to not

less than - what, 45 days now that we've got to or 30 days?

22

MR. JEPPESEN:

23

THE COURT:

24
25

You've already signed the

You'll reaffirm signing the statement that you

19

21

Guilty or not

It's down to 45.

Do you want to waive time for

sentencing so that you can work on a presentence report© J
MR. EDWARDS:

You bet.

±"*JL|

I'd like that.
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1

THE COURT:

And then you can withdraw your guilty

2

plea to either one of the two counts or to both within 30

3

days from the date hereof.

4

granted unless you can show good cause.

It will not be automatically
Okay?

Any questions

5 I before you leave?
MR. EDWARDS:

I don't.

7 I

THE CLERK:

Sentencing is September 23, at 9:30.

8

(Proceedings concluded)

9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

oo ir;
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C E R T I F I C A T E
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF TOOELE

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the Hearing on the case of STATE
OF UTAH, vs. WILLIAM MICHAEL EDWARDS, was electronically
recorded by the Third Circuit Court, Tooele County, State of
Utah.
That the said witnesses were, before examination, duly
sworn to testify the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but
the truth in said cause.
That the said testimony of said witnesses was
electronically recorded, and thereafter caused by me to be
transcribed into type writing, and that a true, and correct
transcription of said testimony so taken and transcribed is
set forth in the foregoing pages numbered from 1 to 9,
inclusive and said witnesses testified and said as in the
foregoing annexed testimony.
WITNESS MY HAND and official seal at Salt Lake City,
Utah, this 26th day of September, 1996.

mmmWm!mmmmmt^mXmm^

Lanette Shindurling,

RPR

My Commission E x p i r e s :

(Li^/f /ff?
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J. FRANKLIN ALLRED, A0058
Attorney for Defendant
321 South 600 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801)531-1990

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
WILLIAM MIKE EDWARDS,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO WITHDRAW GUILTY PLEAS
Judge LEE DEVER

Docket No: %

/£><££)£/'V

The Defendant's Motion To Withdraw His Guilty Pleas came on regularly for hearing
before the Honorable, Lee Dever, judge of the above entitled Court in his Court Room on
Monday, December 2, 1996, at the hour of 1:30 p.m. Counsel for the Defendant, J. Franklin
Allred, was present and the Defendant was present in person and, the State of Utah was
represented by Deputy County Attorney, Alan Jeppesen. The Defendant was sworn and
testified and certain exhibits were marked and identified and received and the Court having
heard the testimony of the Defendant, having reviewed the exhibits received as evidence,

1

00

0^

having read the transcript of the proceedings at the time the plea were entered and having
read and reviewed the STATEMENT OF DEFENDANT, signed by the Defendant at the time
the pleas were entered and the Court having heard and considered the argument of both
counsel in connection with their respective positions and being fully advised now therefore
makes the following order:
1. The Court finds that the pleas of guilty to the charges, and each of them, were
freely, knowingly and voluntarily entered by the Defendant.
2. The Motion of the Defendant To Withdraw His Guilty Pleas Is Denied.

DATED this

'

day of January, 1997.

At approved as to form and content
this 3
day of January, 1997.
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DELIVERY CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that on the

H
/

)fjfelfc^ I personally
pc
hand delivered a copy
day of

of the foregoing ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO WITHDRAW GUILTY
PLEAS to Alan K. Jeppesen.

Dated this

£

ft

day of January, 1997
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Constitution of Utah

Article I section 7

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law.
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, section 1
All persons born or naturalized in the United
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.

559

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
AMENDMENT XHI

Section
1. (Slavery prohibited.!
2. [Power to enforce amendment.]
Section 1. [Slavery prohibited.]
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment.]
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
Section 1

[Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several
States according to their respective numbers, counting the
whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not
taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice
of electors for President and Vice-President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature
thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State,
being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in
rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress,
or Elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office,
civil or military, under the United States, or under any State,
who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of
any State, to support the Constitution of the United States,
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the
same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But
Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove
such disability.
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions

Amend. XVIII, § 1

and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation
incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave;
but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal
and void.
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article.
AMENDMENT XV
Section
1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to disqualify.}
2. [Power to enforce amendment. 1
Section 1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color
not to disqualify.]
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment.]
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation.
AMENDMENT XVI
[Income tax.]
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any
census or enumeration.
AMENDMENT XVII
[Election of senators.]
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six
years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in
each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors
of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State
in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue
writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the
legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to
make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the
election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid
as part of the Constitution.
AMENDMENT XVIII
[REPEALED DECEMBER 5, 1933. SEE AMENDMENT
XXI, SECTION 1.1
Section
1. [National prohibition — Intoxicating liquors.]
2. [Concurrent power to enforce amendment.]
3. [Time limit for adoption.]
Section 1. [National prohibition — Intoxicating liquors.]
After one year from the ratification of this article the
manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof

<2) If a damaged vehicle sticker describing the damage is
affixed to the vehicle, a report under this section is not
required.
1987
41-6-40.

Accident reports — When confidential — Ins u r a n c e policy information — Use as e v i d e n c e
— P e n a l t y for false information.
(1) All written reports required in this article to be forwarded to the department by operators or owners of vehicles
involved in accidents or by garages are without prejudice to
the reporting individual and are for the confidential use of the
department or other state agencies having use for the records
for accident prevention purposes. However, the department
may disclose the identity of a person involved in an accident
when the identity is not otherwise known or when the person
denies his presence at the accident. The department shall
disclose whether any person or vehicle involved in an accident
reported under this section was covered by a vehicle insurance
policy, and the name of the insurer.
(2) Written reports forwarded under this section may not be
used as evidence in any trial, civil or criminal, arising out of an
accident, except that the department shall furnish upon
demand of any party to the trial or upon demand of any court
a certificate showing that a specified accident report has or
has not been made to the department in compliance with law,
and if the report has been made, the date, time, and location
of the accident, the names and addresses of the drivers, the
owners of the vehicles involved, and the investigating officers.
The reports may be used as evidence when necessary to
prosecute charges filed in connection with a violation of
Subsection (3).
(3) A person who gives information in oral or written
reports as required in this chapter knowing or having reason
to believe that the information is false is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
1987
41-6-41.

Statistical information r e g a r d i n g a c c i d e n t s —
Annual publication.
The department shail tabulate and may analyze all accident
reports and shall publish annually, or at more frequent
intervals, related statistical information as to the number and
circumstances of traffic accidents.
1987
41-6-42. Local p o w e r s to require report.
A local authority may by ordinance require that the operator
of a vehicle involved in any accident, or the owner of the
vehicle, also file with the designated municipal department a
written report of the accident or a copy of any report required
under this article to be filed with the department on accidents
occurring within its jurisdiction. All reports are for the confidential use of the municipal department and are subject to
Section 41-6-40.
1987
ARTICLE 5
IMMV1NU W Hi 1 IK INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS
DRIVING
41-6-43.
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MOTOR VEHICLES

(I-(>-4()

Local DUI a n d r e l a t e d o r d i n a n c e s a n d reckless d r i v i n g o r d i n a n c e s — C o n s i s t e n t w i t h
code.
(1) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs
a person's operating or being in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle while having alcohol in the blood or while under
the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence
of alcohol and any drug, or that governs, in relation to any of
those matters, the use of a chemical test or chemical tests, or
evidentiary presumptions, or penalties, or that governs any
combination of those matters, shall be consistent with the
provisions in this code which govern those matters.

(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs
reckless driving, or operating a vehicle in willful or wanton
disregard for the safety of persons or property shall be
consistent with the provisions of this code which govern those
matters.
1987
41-6-43.5. Definitions.
As used in this article, "vehicle" or "motor vehicle," in
addition to the definitions provided under Section 41-6-1,
includes off-highway vehicles as defined under Section 4122-2.
1996
41-6-43.10.
41-6-44.

Repealed.

1985

Driving u n d e r the influence of alcohol, drugs,
or w i t h specified or unsafe blood alcohol conc e n t r a t i o n — M e a s u r e m e n t of blood o r breath
alcohol — Criminal p u n i s h m e n t — Arrest
w i t h o u t w a r r a n t — P e n a l t i e s — Suspension
or r e v o c a t i o n of l i c e n s e .
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "prior conviction" means any conviction for a violation of:
(i) this section;
(ii) alcohol-related reckless driving under Subsections (9) and (10);
(iii) local ordinances similar to this section or alcohol-related reckless driving adopted in compliance
with Section 41-6-43;
(iv) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-207;
or
(v) statutes or ordinances in effect in any other
state, the United States, or any district, possession,
or territory of the United States which would constitute a violation of this section or alcohol-related
reckless driving if committed in this state, including
punishments administered under 10 U.S.C. 815;
(b) a violation of this section includes a violation under
a local ordinance similar to this section adopted in compliance with Section 41-6-43; and
(c) the standard of negligence is that of simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that an
ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises under
like or similar circumstances.
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical
control of a vehicle within this state if the person:
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of
.08 grams or greater as shown by a chemical test
given within two hours after the alleged operation or
physical control; or
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or
the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a
degree that renders the person incapable of safely
operating a vehicle.
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this
section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a
drug is not a defense against any charge of violating this
section.
(c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based
jpon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and
alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon
grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath.
(3) A person convicted the first or second time of a violation
of Subsection (2) is guilty of a:
(a) class B misdemeanor; or
(b) class A misdemeanor if the person:
(i) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as
a proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a
negligent manner; or
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<ii) had a passenger under 16 years of age in the
vehicle at the time of the offense.
il <a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall,
upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence
of not less than 48 consecutive hours nor more than 240
hours.
(b) The court- may, as an alternative to all or part of a
jail sentence, require the person to work in a communityservice work program for not less than 24 hours nor more
than 50 hours.
<c) In addition to the jail sentence or communityservice work program, the court shall:
t i) order the person to participate in an assessment
and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate;
and
di) impose a fine of not less than $700, but not
more than $1,000.
(ii) For a violation committed after July 1, 1993,
the court may order the person to obtain treatment at
an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility
if the licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility determines that the person has a problem
condition involving alcohol or drugs.
")) (a) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within
six years of a prior conviction under this section, the court
shall as part of any sentence impose a mandatory jail
sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours nor more
than 720 hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a
jail sentence, require the person to work in a communityservice work program for not less than 80 hours nor more
than 240 hours.
ic) In addition to the jail sentence or communityservice work program, the court shall:
O) order the person to participate in an assessment
and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate;
and
(ii) impose a fine of not less than $800, but not
more than $1,000.
(d) The court may order the person to obtain treatment
at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility.
5) (a) A third or subsequent conviction for a violation
committed within six years of two or more prior convictions under this section is a:
(i) class A misdemeanor except as provided in
Subsection (ii); and
(ii) third degree felony if at least:
(A) three prior convictions are for violations
committed after April 23, 1990; or
(B) two prior convictions are for violations
committed after July 1, 1996.
(b) (i) Under Subsection (aHi) the court shall as part of
any sentence impose a fine of not less than $2,000,
but not more than $5,000 and impose a mandatory
jail sentence of not less than 720 hours nor more than
2,160 hours.
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of
a jail sentence, require the person to work in a
community-service work program for not less than
240 nor more than 720 hours, but only if the court
enters in writing on the record the reason it finds the
defendant should not serve the jail sentence. Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program approved by the court
may be a sentencing alternative to incarceration or
community service if the program provides intensive
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care or inpatient treatment and long-term closely
supervised follow-through after the treatment.
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or communityservice work program, the court shall order the
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility,
(c) Under Subsection (aMii) if the court suspends the
execution of a prison sentence and places the defendant
on probation the court shall impose:
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500;
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,000
hours; and
(iii) an order requiring the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation
program providing intensive care or inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised followthrough after treatment.
(7) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence required
under this section may not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or probation until
any sentence imposed under this section has been served.
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a
violation under this section may not be terminated.
(b) The department may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked as a result of the conviction under this
section, until the convicted person has furnished evidence
satisfactory to the department that:
(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency assessment, education, treatment, and rehabilitation ordered for a violation committed after July 1, 1993,
have been completed;
(ii) all fines and fees including fees for restitution
and rehabilitation costs assessed against the person
have been paid, if the conviction is a second or
subsequent conviction for a violation committed
within six years of a prior violation; and
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any abusive
or illegal manner as certified by a licensed alcohol or
drug dependency rehabilitation facility, if the conviction is for a third or subsequent conviction for a
violation committed within six years of two prior
violations committed after July 1, 1993.
(8) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections <4), (5), and <6)
that require a sentencing court to order a convicted
person to: participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the discretion of the
court, treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation facility; obtain, mandatorily, treatment
at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility; or do a combination of those things, apply to a
conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-45 under
Subsection (9).
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding education or treatment at an alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility, or both, in connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction
under Section 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the
court would render in connection with applying respectively, the first, second, or subsequent conviction
requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6).
(b) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program and any community-based or other education program provided for in this section shall be approved by the
Department of Human Services.
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or
no contest to a charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45
or of an ordinance enacted under Section 41-6-43 in
satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an original
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charge of a violation of this section, the prosecution
shall state for the record a factual basis for the plea,
including whether or not there had been consumption
of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the
defendant in connection with the violation.
<ii> The statement is an offer of proof of the facts
that shows whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant,
in connection with the violation.
<b> The court shall advise the defendant before accepting the plea offered under this subsection of the consequences of a violation of Section 41-6-45.
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section 41-6-45 entered under this subsection.
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person
jr a violation of this section when the officer has probable
ause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in his
)iesence. and if the officer has probable cause to believe that
he violation was committed by the person.
(11) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall:
(il suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a
person convicted for the first time under Subsection
(2);
<ii) revoke for one year the license of a person
convicted of any subsequent offense under Subsection
<2) if the violation is committed within a period of six
years from the date of the prior violation; and
<iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as
ordered by the court under Subsection < 12).
(b) The department shall subtract from any suspension
or revocation period the number of days for which a
license was previously suspended under Section 5.3-3-223,
if the previous suspension was based on the same occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based.
<12) <a> In addition to any other penalties provided in this
section, a court may order the operator's license of a
person who is convicted of a violation of Subsection «2) to
be suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90
days, 180 days, or one year to remove from the highways
those persons who have shown they are safety hazards.
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license
under this subsection, the court shall prepare and send to
the Driver License Division of the Department of Public
Safety an order to suspend or revoke that persons driving
privileges for a specified period of time.
199«
41-6-44.1. P r o c e d u r e s — A d j u d i c a t i v e p r o c e e d i n g s .
The Department of Public Safety shall comply with the
procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its
adjudicative proceedings.
1987
41-6-44.2.

Repealed.

1983

41-6-44.3.

S t a n d a r d s for c h e m i c a l b r e a t h a n a l y s i s —
Evidence.
(1) The commissioner of the Department of Public Safety
shall establish standards for the administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath, including
standards of training.
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to
prove t h a t a person was operating or in actual physical control
of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or
operating with a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily
prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of
acts, conditions, or events to prove that the analysis was made
and the instrument used was accurate, according to standards
established in Subsection (1), are admissible if:
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular

course of the investigation at or about the time of the act,
condition, or event; and
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(b) the source of information from which made and the
method and circumstances of their preparation indicate
their trustworthiness.
(3) If the judge finds t h a t the standards established under
Subsection (1) and the conditions of Subsection (2) have been
met, there is a presumption that the test results are valid and
further foundation for introduction of the evidence is unnecessary.
1987
41 -6-44.4.

R e n u m b e r e d a s § 53-3-231.

iiiiin

41-6-44.5.

Admissibility of c h e m i c a l test results in actions for d r i v i n g u n d e r t h e influence —
Weight of e v i d e n c e .
(1) (a) In any civil or criminal action or proceeding in which
it is material to prove that a person was operating or in
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the
influence of alcohol or drugs or with a blood or breath
alcohol content statutorily prohibited, the results of a
chemical test or tests as authorized in Section 41-6-44.10
are admissible as evidence.
(b) In a criminal proceeding, noncompliance with Section 41-6-44.10 does not render the results of a chemical
test inadmissible. Evidence of a defendant's blood or
breath alcohol content or drug content is admissible
except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the
constitution.
(2) If the chemical test was taken more than two hours after
the alleged driving or actual physical control, the test result is
admissible as evidence of the person's blood or breath alcohol
level at the time of the alleged operating or actual physical
control, but the trier of fact shall determine what weight is
given to the result of the test.
(3) This section does not prevent a court irom receiving
otherwise admissible evidence as to a defendant's blood or
breath alcohol level or drug level at the time of the alleged
operating or actual physical control.
iftui
41-6-44.6.

Definitions — D r i v i n g w i t h a n y measurable
c o n t r o l l e d s u b s t a n c e in t h e b o d y — Penalties
— Arrest w i t h o u t warrant.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Controlled substance" means any substance scheduled under Section 58-37-4.
(b) "Practitioner" h a s the same meaning as provided in
Section 58-37-2.
(c) "Prescribe" has the same meaning as provided in
Section 58-37-2.
(d) "Prescription" h a s the same meaning as provided in
Section 58-37-2.
(2) In cases not amounting to a violation of Section 41-6-44,
a person may not operate or be in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle within this state if the person has any measurable controlled substance or metabolite of a controlled substance in the person's body.
(3) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution under this
section that the controlled substance was involuntarily ingested by the accused or prescribed by a practitioner for use by
the accused.
(4) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is
guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(5) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person
for a violation of this section when the officer h a s probable
cause to believe the violation h a s occurred, although not in the
officer's presence, and if the officer has probable cause to
believe that the violation was committed by the person.
(6) The Driver License Division shall:
(a) suspend, for 90 days, the driver license of a person
convicted under Subsection (2); and

( fill

Utah Code Ann. section 53-3-220 (1994)
(1)(a) The division shall immediately revoke or,
when this chapter or Title 41, Chapter 6, Traffic Rules
and Regulations, specifically provides for denial,
suspension, or disqualification, the division shall
deny, suspend, or disqualify the license of a person
upon receiving a record of his conviction for any of
the following offenses:
(i) manslaughter or negligent
homicide resulting from driving a
motor vehicle, or automobile
homicide under Section 76-5-207;
(ii) driving or being in
actual physical control of a motor
vehicle while under the influence
of alcohol, any drug, or
combination of them to a degree
that renders the person incapable
of safely driving a motor vehicle
as prohibited in Section 41-6-44 or
as prohibited in an ordinance that
complies with the requirements of
Subsection 41-6-43(1);
(iii) driving or being in
actual physical control of a motor
vehicle while having a blood or
breath alcohol content prohibited
in Section 41-6-44 or as prohibited
in an ordinance that complies with
the requirements of Subsection
41-6-43 (1) ;
(iv) perjury or the making of
a false affidavit to the division
under this chapter, Title 41, Motor
Vehicles, or any other law of this
state requiring the registration of
motor vehicles or regulating
driving on highways;
(v) any offense punishable as
a felony under the motor vehicle
laws of this state;
(vi) any other felony in which
a motor vehicle is used;
(vii) failure to stop and
render aid as required under the
laws of this state if a motor
vehicle accident results in the
death or personal injury of
another;
(viii) two charges of reckless
driving committed within a period
of 12 months; but if upon a first
conviction of reckless driving the
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judge or justice recommends
suspension of the convicted
person's license, the division may
after a hearing suspend the license
for a period of three months;
(ix) failure to bring a motor
vehicle to a stop at the command of
a peace officer as required in
Section 41-6-13.5;
(x) any offense specified in
Part 4 of this chapter that
requires disqualification;
(xi) discharging or allowing
the discharge of a firearm from a
vehicle in violation of Subsection
76-10-508(2) ;
(xii) using, allowing the use
of, or causing to be used any
explosive, chemical, or incendiary
device from a vehicle in violation
of Subsection 76-10-306 (4) (b) ; and
(xiii) operating or being in
actual physical control of a motor
vehicle while having any measurable
controlled substance or metabolite
of a controlled substance in the
person's body in violation of
Section 41-6-44.6.
(b) The division shall immediately
revoke the license of a person upon receiving
a record of an adjudication under Title 78,
Chapter 3a, Juvenile Courts, for any of the
following offenses:
(i) discharging or allowing
the discharge of a firearm from a
vehicle in violation of Subsection
76-10-508 (2) ; and
(ii) using, allowing the use
of, or causing to be used any
explosive, chemical, or incendiary
device from a vehicle in violation
of Subsection 76-10-306(4)(b).
(c) The division shall immediately
suspend for six months the license of a
person upon receiving a record of conviction
for any of the following offenses:
(i) any violation of:
(A) Title 58,
Chapter 37, Utah
Controlled Substances
Act;
(B) Title 58,
Chapter 3 7a, Utah Drug
Paraphernalia Act;

(C) Title 58,
Chapter 37b, Imitation
Controlled Substances
Act;
(D) Title 58,
Chapter 37c, Utah
Controlled Substance
Precursor Act; or
(E) Title 58,
Chapter 37d, Clandestine
Drug Lab Act; or
(ii) any criminal offense that
prohibits:
(A) possession,
distribution,
manufacture, cultivation,
sale, or transfer of any
substance that is
prohibited under the acts
described in Subsection
(c) (i) ; or
(B) the attempt or
conspiracy to possess,
distribute, manufacture,
cultivate, sell, or
transfer any substance
that is prohibited under
the acts described in
Subsection (c)(i).
(2) The division shall extend the period of the
first denial, suspension, revocation, or
disqualification for an additional like period, upon
receiving:
(a) a record of the conviction of any
person on a charge of driving a motor vehicle
while the person's license is denied,
suspended, revoked, or disqualified;
(b) a record of a conviction of the
person for any violation of the motor vehicle
law in which the person was involved as a
driver;
(c) a report of an arrest of the person
for any violation of the motor vehicle law in
which the person was involved as a driver;
or
(d) a report of an accident in which the
person was involved as a driver.
(3) When the division receives a report under
Subsection (2)(c) or (d) that a person is driving while
the person's license is denied, suspended,
disqualified, or revoked, the person is entitled to a
hearing regarding the extension of the time of denial,
suspension, disqualification, or revocation originally
imposed under Section 53-3-221.

(4)(a) The division may extend to a person the
limited privilege of driving a motor vehicle to and
from the person's place of employment or within other
specified limits on recommendation of the trial judge
in any case where a person is convicted of any of the
offenses referred to in Subsections (1) and (2) except
(i) automobile homicide under
Subsection (1)(a)(i);
(ii) those offenses referred
to in Subsections (1) (a) (ii) ,
(a) (iii) , (a) (xi) , (a) (xii) ,
(a) (xiii) , ( 1 M b ) , and (1) (c) ; and
(iii) those offenses referred
to in Subsection (2) when the
original denial, suspension,
revocation, or disqualification was
imposed because of a violation of
Section 41-6-44, Section 41-6-44.6,
a local ordinance which complies
with the requirements of Subsection
41-6-43(1), Section 41-6-44.10, or
Section 76-5-207, or a criminal
prohibition that the person was
charged with violating as a result
of a plea bargain after having been
originally charged with violating
one or more of these sections or
ordinances.
(b) This discretionary privilege is
limited to when undue hardship would result
from a failure to grant the privilege and may
be granted only once to any individual during
any single period of denial, suspension,
revocation, or disqualification, or extension
of that denial, suspension, revocation, or
disqualification.
(c) A limited CDL may not be granted to
an individual disqualified under Part 4 of
this chapter or whose license has been
revoked, suspended, cancelled, or denied
under this chapter.
Utah Code Ann. section 58-37-8
(1) Prohibited acts A --Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this
chapter, it is unlawful for any person
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or
dispense, or to possess with intent
to produce, manufacture, or
dispense, a controlled or
counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled

or counterfeit substance, or to
agree, consent, offer, or arrange
to distribute a controlled or
counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled
substance in the course of his
business as a sales representative
of a manufacturer or distributor of
substances listed in Schedules II
through V except that he may
possess such controlled substances
when they are prescribed to him by
a licensed practitioner; or
(iv) possess a controlled or
counterfeit substance with intent
to distribute.
(b) Any person convicted of violating
Subsection (1)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in
Schedule I or II is guilty of a
second degree felony and upon a
second or subsequent conviction of
Subsection (1)(a) is guilty of a
first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in
Schedule III or IV, or marijuana,
is guilty of a third degree felony,
and upon a second or subsequent
conviction punishable under this
subsection is guilty of a second
degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified
in Schedule V is guilty of a class
A misdemeanor and upon a second or
subsequent conviction punishable
under this subsection is guilty of
a third degree felony.
(2) Prohibited acts B--Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly
and intentionally to possess or use
a controlled substance, unless it
was obtained under a valid
prescription or order, directly
from a practitioner while acting in
the course of his professional
practice, or as otherwise
authorized by this subsection;
(ii) for any owner, tenant,
licensee, or person in control of
any building, room, tenement,
vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other
place knowingly and intentionally
to permit them to be occupied by
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Englis i J anguage?
MR. EDWARDS :

Yes, I do.

3

THE COURT:

4

drugs cor alcohol at this time?

Are you under the influence of any

5

MR. EDWARDS :

6

THE COURT:

No, I'm not.

Do you have any mental problems> that

7

impair your judgment :Ln deciding whether to plead gui lty or

8

not gu:Llty?
MR. EDWARDS :

9

THE COURT:

10

No, I don't.

You don't have an attorney, so
at- o +• o m o n t" a

11

t-

12

have to enter a plea of guilty, we'll go to trial if you want

13

to go to trial.
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You don't want to go to trial?

14

MR. EDWARDS:

15

THE COURT:

No, I don"t.

Now your plea must be unconditional.

16

The fact that the State may make a recommendation doesn't

17

necessarily mean that the Judge who imposes the sentence will

18

follow those recommendations.

19

unconditional plea.

20

about it?

It's got to be an

Do you understand that?

21

MR. EDWARDS: No.

22

THE COURT:

Any question

If you're not placed on probation

23

you're not going to come back in and say, "Well, they

24

promised me I'd get probation?"

25

MR. EDWARDS:

AA

j '^t

(Inaudible).
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1
2

THE COURT:

So as long as we've got that clear.

Now, you've had an opportunity to go over that statement?

3

MR. EDWARDS:

4

THE COURT:

5

Do you have any questions about that

statement?

6

MR. EDWARDS:

7

THE COURT:

8

Yes, I have.

No, I don't.

Are the answers given in that statement

truthful and correct?

9

MR. EDWARDS:

10

THE COURT:

Yes, they are.

You understand by entering a plea of

11

guilty you're going to be giving up certain constitutional

12

rights, such as the right to a speedy trial, a right to be

13

tried by a jury.

14

the proceedings and it will not be held against you.

15

have a right to call witnesses in your own behalf. You have a

16

right to confront and cross examine witnesses called by the

17

State.

18

proceedings will not be held against you.

19

You have a right to remain silent during

The fact that you remain silent during the

The State must prove each and every element of the crime

20

beyond a reasonable doubt.

21

case will be dismissed against you.

22

convicted you have the right to appeal.

23

You

If the State fails to do so, the
However, if you're

Now, the penalty for a third degree felony is 0-5 years

24

in the Utah State Prison and a $5,000 fine.

The elements of

25

the crime are found in Title 58, Chapter 37, Secti@iQ 8 /£jja^i.
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persons unlawfully possessing,
using, or distributing controlled
substances in any of those
locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly
and intentionally to be present
where controlled substances are
being used or possessed in
violation of this chapter and the
use or possession is open, obvious,
apparent, and not concealed from
those present; however, a person
may not be convicted under this
subsection if the evidence shows
that he did not use the substance
himself or advise, encourage, or
assist anyone else to do so; any
incidence of prior unlawful use of
controlled substances by the
defendant may be admitted to rebut
this defense;
(iv) for any person knowingly
and intentionally to possess an
altered or forged prescription or
written order for a controlled
substance;
(v) for a practitioner
licensed under this chapter
knowingly and intentionally to
prescribe, administer, or dispense
a controlled substance to a
juvenile, without first obtaining
the consent required in Section
78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or
person standing in loco parentis of
the juvenile except in cases of an
emergency; for purposes of this
subsection, a juvenile means a
"minor" as defined in Section
78-3a-103, and "emergency" means
any physical condition requiring
the administration of a controlled
substance for immediate relief of
pain or suffering;
(vi) for a practitioner
licensed under this chapter
knowingly and intentionally to
prescribe or administer dosages of
a controlled substance in excess of
medically recognized quantities
necessary to treat the ailment,
malady, or condition of the
ultimate user; or
(vii) for any person to

prescribe, administer, or dispense
any controlled substance to another
person knowing that the other
person is using a false name,
address, or other personal
information for the purpose of
securing the same.
(b) Any person convicted of violating
Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount
is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of
a second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in
Schedule I or II, or marijuana, if
the amount is more than 16 ounces,
but less than 100 pounds, is guilty
of a third degree felony; or
(iii) marijuana, if the
marijuana is not in the form of an
extracted resin from any part of
the plant, and the amount is more
than one ounce but less than 16
ounces, is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating
Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the
exterior boundaries of property occupied by
any correctional facility as defined in
Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other
place of confinement shall be sentenced to a
penalty one degree greater than provided in
Subsection (2)(b).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent
conviction of possession of any controlled
substance by a person previously convicted
under Subsection (2)(b), that person shall be
sentenced to a one degree greater penalty
than provided in this subsection.
(e) Any person who violates Subsection
(2)(a)(i) with respect to all other
controlled substances not included in
Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii),
including less than one ounce of marijuana,
is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
Upon a
second conviction for possession of a
controlled substance as provided in this
subsection, the person is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent
conviction he is guilty of a third degree
felony.
(f) Any person convicted of violating
Subsections (2)(a)(ii) through (2)(a)(vii)
is:
(i) on a first conviction,

guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction,
guilty of a class A misdemeanor;
and
(iii) on a third or subsequent
conviction, guilty of a third
degree felony.
(3) Prohibited acts C--Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person:
(i) who is subject to this
chapter to distribute or dispense a
controlled substance in violation
of this chapter;
(ii) who is a licensee to
manufacture, distribute, or
dispense a controlled substance to
another licensee or other
authorized person not authorized by
his license;
(iii) to omit, remove, alter,
or obliterate a symbol required by
this chapter or by a rule issued
under this chapter;
(iv) to refuse or fail to
make, keep, or furnish any record,
notification, order form,
statement, invoice, or information
required under this chapter; or
(v) to refuse entry into any
premises for inspection as
authorized by this chapter.
(b) Any person convicted of violating
Subsection (3)(a) shall be punished by a
civil penalty of not more than $5,000.
The
proceedings are independent of, and not in
lieu of, criminal proceedings under this
chapter or any other law of this state.
If
the violation is prosecuted by information or
indictment which alleges the violation was
committed knowingly or intentionally, that
person is upon conviction guilty of a third
degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D--Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person
knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of
the manufacture or distribution of
a controlled substance a license
number which is fictitious,
revoked, suspended, or issued to
another person or, for the purpose
of obtaining a controlled
substance, to assume the title of,
or represent himself to be, a

manufacturer, wholesaler,
apothecary, physician, dentist,
veterinarian, or other authorized
person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain
possession of, to procure or
attempt to procure the
administration of, to obtain a
prescription for, to prescribe or
dispense to any person known to be
attempting to acquire or obtain
possession of, or to procure the
administration of any controlled
substance by misrepresentation or
failure by the person to disclose
his receiving any controlled
substance from another source,
fraud, forgery, deception,
subterfuge, alteration of a
prescription or written order for a
controlled substance, or the use of
a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or
forged prescription or written
order for a controlled substance,
or to utter the same, or to alter
any prescription or written order
issued or written under the terms
of this chapter;
(iv) to furnish false or
fraudulent material information in
any application, report, or other
document required to be kept by
this chapter or to willfully make
any false statement in any
prescription, order, report, or
record required by this chapter;
or
(v) to make, distribute, or
possess any punch, die, plate,
stone, or other thing designed to
print, imprint, or reproduce the
trademark, trade name, or other
identifying mark, imprint, or
device of another or any likeness
of any of the foregoing upon any
drug or container or labeling so as
to render any drug a counterfeit
controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating
Subsection (4)(a) is guilty of a third degree
felony.
(5) Prohibited acts E--Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of

this section, a person not authorized under
this chapter who commits any act declared to
be unlawful under this section, Title 58,
Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or
under Title 58, Chapter 37b, Imitation
Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction
subject to the penalties and classifications
under Subsection (5)(b) if the act is
committed:
(i) in a public or private
elementary or secondary school or
on the grounds of any of those
schools;
(ii) in a public or private
vocational school or post-secondary
institution or on the grounds of
any of those schools or
institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any
building, park, stadium, or other
structure or grounds which are, at
the time of the act, being used for
an activity sponsored by or through
a school or institution under
Subsections (5)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a
preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park,
amusement park, arcade, or
recreation center;
(vi) in a church or synagogue;
(vii) in a shopping mall,
sports facility, stadium, arena,
theater, movie house, playhouse, or
parking lot or structure adjacent
thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot
or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any
structure, facility, or grounds
included in Subsections (5)(a)(i)
through (viii); or
(x) with a person younger than
18 years of age, regardless of
where the act occurs.
(b) A person convicted under this
subsection is guilty of a first degree felony
and shall be imprisoned for a term of not
less than five years if the penalty that
would otherwise have been established but for
this subsection would have been a first
degree felony.
Imposition or execution of
the sentence may not be suspended, and the
person is not eligible for parole until the

minimum term of imprisonment under this
subsection has been served.
(c) If the classification that would
otherwise have been established would have
been less than a first degree felony but for
this subsection, a person convicted under
this subsection is guilty of one degree more
than the maximum penalty prescribed for that
offense.
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution
under this subsection that the actor
mistakenly believed the individual to be 18
years of age or older at the time of the
offense or was unaware of the individual's
true age; nor that the actor mistakenly
believed that the location where the act
occurred was not as described in Subsection
(5)(a) or was unaware that the location where
the act occurred was as described in
Subsection (5)(a).
(6) Any violation of this chapter for which no
penalty is specified is a class B misdemeanor.
(7) Any person who attempts or conspires to commit
any offense unlawful under this chapter is upon
conviction guilty of one degree less than the maximum
penalty prescribed for that offense.
(8)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this
section is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any
civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized
by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter
violates a federal law or the law of another
state, conviction or acquittal under federal
law or the law of another state for the same
act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(9)(a) When it appears to the court at the time of
sentencing any person convicted under this chapter that
the person has previously been convicted of an offense
under the laws of this state, the United States, or
another state, which if committed in this state would
be an offense within this chapter and it appears that
probation would not be of benefit to the defendant or
that probation would be contrary to the interest,
welfare, or protection of society, the court,
notwithstanding Section 77-18-1, may if there is
compliance with Subsection (9)(b), impose a minimum
term to be served by the defendant, of up to 1/2 the
maximum sentence imposed by law for the offense
committed.
For violations of this section, this
subsection supersedes Section 77-18-4.
(b)(i) Before any person may be
sentenced to a minimum term as provided in
Subsection (9)(a), the prosecuting attorney,
or grand jury if an indictment, shall cause
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to be subscribed upon the complaint, in
misdemeanor cases, or the information or
indictment, in addition to the substantive
offense charged, a statement setting forth
the alleged past conviction of the defendant
and specifically stating the date and place
of conviction and the offense of which the
defendant was convicted.
The allegation
shall be presented to the defendant at the
time of his arraignment, or afterwards by
leave of court, but in no event later than
two days prior to the trial of the offense
charged or the defendant's entering a plea of
guilty.
At the time of arraignment or a
later date when granted by the court, the
court shall read the allegation of the
previous conviction to the defendant, provide
him or his counsel with a copy of it, and
explain to the defendant the consequences of
the allegation under Subsection (9)(a).
The
allegation of the past conviction of the
defendant is not admissible in a jury trial,
except where the admissibility in evidence of
a previous conviction is otherwise recognized
as admissible by law.
(ii) The court, following
conviction of the defendant of the
substantive offense charged and
prior to imposing sentence, shall
inform the defendant of its
decision to impose a minimum
sentence under Subsection (9)(a)
and inquire as to whether the
defendant admits or denies the
previous conviction.
If the
defendant denies the previous
conviction, the court shall afford
him an opportunity to present
evidence showing that the
allegation of the past conviction
is erroneous or the conviction was
lawfully vacated or the defendant
was pardoned.
The evidence shall
be made a matter of record.
Following the evidence, the court
shall make a finding as to whether
the defendant has a previous
conviction, which finding is final,
except for a showing of abuse of
discretion.
Following the
findings by the court, the
defendant shall be sentenced under
Subsection (9)(a) or under the
appropriate penalty provided by
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law, as the court in its discretion
determines.
(c) Any person sentenced on a second
offense to probation who violates that
probation is subject to Subsections (9)(a)
and (9) (b) .
(d) For violations of this section,
Subsection (9) supersedes Section 76-3-203.5.
(10) In any prosecution for a violation of this
chapter, evidence or proof which shows a person or
persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed,
or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is
prima facie evidence that the person or persons did so
with knowledge of the character of the substance or
substances.
(11) This section does not prohibit a
veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of his
professional practice only and not for humans, from
prescribing, dispensing, or administering controlled
substances or from causing the substances to be
administered by an assistant or orderly under his
direction and supervision.
(12) Civil or criminal liability may not be
imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the
Controlled Substances Act who manufactures,
distributes, or possesses an imitation
controlled substance for use as a placebo or
investigational new drug by a registered
practitioner in the ordinary course of
professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting
in the course and legitimate scope of his
employment.
(13) If any provision of this chapter, or the
application of any provision to any person or
circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this
chapter shall be given effect without the invalid
provision or application.
Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-203
A person who has been convicted of a felony may be
sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as
follows:
(1) In the case of a felony of the first degree,
for a term at not less than five years, unless
otherwise specifically provided by law, and which may
be for life but if the trier of fact finds a dangerous
weapon or a facsimile or the representation of a
dangerous weapon, as provided in Section 76-1-601, was
used in the commission or furtherance of the felony,
the court shall additionally sentence the person

convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively
and not concurrently; and the court may additionally
sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not
concurrently.
(2) In the case of a felony of the second degree,
for a term at not less than one year nor more than 15
years but if the trier of fact finds a dangerous weapon
or a facsimile or the representation of a dangerous
weapon, as provided in Section 76-1-601, was used in
the commission or furtherance of the felony, the court
shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a
term of one year to run consecutively and not
concurrently;
and the court may additionally sentence
the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to
exceed five years to run consecutively and not
concurrently.
(3) In the case of a felony of the third degree,
for a term not to exceed five years but if the trier of
fact finds a dangerous weapon or a facsimile or the
representation of a dangerous weapon, as provided in
Section 76-1-601, was used in the commission or
furtherance of the felony, the court may additionally
sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term
not to exceed five years to run consecutively and not
concurrently.
(4) Any person who has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment for a felony in which a dangerous weapon,
as provided in Section 76-1-601, was used or involved
in the accomplishment of the felony and is convicted of
another felony when a dangerous weapon was used or
involved in the accomplishment of the felony shall, in
addition to any other sentence imposed, be sentenced
for an indeterminate term to be not less than five nor
more than ten years to run consecutively and not
concurrently.
Utah Code Ann. section 76-3-204
A person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be
sentenced to imprisonment as follows:
(1) In the case of a class A misdemeanor, for a
term not exceeding one year;

(2) In the case of a class B misdemeanor, for a
term not exceeding six months;
(3) In the case of a class C misdemeanor, for a
term not exceeding ninety days.
Utah Code Ann. section 77-13-6
(1) A plea of not guilty may be withdrawn at any
time prior to conviction.
(2)(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be

withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with leave of
the court.
(b) A request to withdraw a plea of
guilty or no contest is made by motion and
shall be made within 3 0 days after the entry
of the plea.
(3) This section does not restrict the rights of
an imprisoned person under Rule 65B, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 11
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a
defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the
defendant waives counsel in open court. The defendant
shall not be required to plead until the defendant has
had a reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no
contest, not guilty by reason of insanity, or guilty
and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the
alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of
insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a
defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall
enter a plea of not guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the
consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty,
the case shall forthwith be set for trial. A defendant
unable to make bail shall be given a preference for an
early trial. In cases other than felonies the court
shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the
requirements for making a written demand for a jury
trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill, and may
not accept the plea until the court has found:
(1) if the defendant is not represented
by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived
the right to counsel and does not desire
counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to
the presumption of innocence, the right
against compulsory self-incrimination, the
right to a speedy public trial before an
impartial jury, the right to confront and
cross-examine in open court the prosecution
witnesses, the right to compel the attendance
of defense witnesses, and that by entering
the plea, these rights are waived;
(4) the defendant understands the nature
and elements of the offense to which the plea
is entered, that upon trial the prosecution
would have the burden of proving each of

those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that the plea is an admission of all those
elements;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and
maximum sentence, and if applicable, the
minimum mandatory nature of the minimum
sentence, that may be imposed for each
offense to which a plea is entered, including
the possibility of the imposition of
consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of
a prior plea discussion and plea agreement,
and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of
the time limits for filing any motion to
withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that
the right of appeal is limited.
(f) Failure to advise the defendant of the time
limits for filing any motion to withdraw a plea of
guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a
ground for setting the plea aside, but may be the
ground for extending the time to make a motion under
Section 77-13-6.
(g)(1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney
or any other party has agreed to request or recommend
the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense,
or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall
be approved by the court.
(2) If sentencing recommendations are
allowed by the court, the court shall advise
the defendant personally that any
recommendation as to sentence is not binding
on the court.
(h)(1) The judge shall not participate in plea
discussions prior to any plea agreement being made by
the prosecuting attorney.
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has
been reached, the judge, upon request of the
parties, may permit the disclosure of the
tentative agreement and the reasons for it,
in advance of the time for tender of the
plea. The judge may then indicate to the
prosecuting attorney and defense counsel
whether the proposed disposition will be
approved.
(3) If the judge then decides that final
disposition should not be in conformity with
the plea agreement, the judge shall advise
the defendant and then call upon the
defendant to either affirm or withdraw the
plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the
consent of the prosecution, a defendant may

enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty
and mentally ill, or no contest, reserving in
the record the right, on appeal from the
judgment, to a review of the adverse
determination of any specified pre-trial
motion. A defendant who prevails on appeal
shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
(j) When a defendant tenders a plea of
guilty and mentally ill, in addition to the
other requirements of this rule, the court
shall hold a hearing within a reasonable time
to determine if the defendant is mentally ill
in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §
77-16a-103.

